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Abstract 
In cloud computing, data and applications are maintained on remote servers and accessed via the 
Internet. Virtualised resources such as dynamic servers are operated through the Internet, which 
increases the economic benefits accrued to customers from software. Cloud computing reduces 
customer concerns about software licenses, hardware, and overall system maintenance. Connections 
between web services are typically enabled using the simple object access protocol (SOAP), and 
extensible markup language (XML) or hypertext transport protocol (HTTP) is used to construct SOAP 
messages. Denial of service (DoS) and distributed DoS (DDoS) are two major problems affecting 
cloud computing services, and it is a challenge to resolve them completely. The identity of the 
perpetrators of these acts is usually difficult to ascertain especially when the attacks are carried out 
using spoofed IP addresses. Consequently, differentiating genuine packets from the packets sent by 
hackers is difficult. The addresses are spoofed with the intention of causing harm to cloud service 
provider communication channels. Distinguishing legitimate messages from illegitimate messages is an 
important step towards solving the problem of DDoS attacks. Modulo and CLASSIE methods 
effectively detect and reduce spoofing attacks using unique rulesets. In this paper, we propose using 
modulo packet marking and a method called reconstruct and drop (RAD) to differentiate and discard 
malicious packets. The proposed method improves the detection and filtering of DDoS attacks. 
Further, the results of comparisons conducted indicate that the proposed method requires fewer bits 
than Huffman code and its performance is better than that of cloud protector. 
 




Cloud computing is a new technique that allows virtualised resources and services, such as 
infrastructure, platform, and software, from one or mo re physical servers to be simultaneously shared 
by many users over the Internet. In cloud computing, clients are able to access and utilise availab le 
resources and pay based on their demand[1]. The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) in the United States defines cloud computing as a model that is convenient, ubiquitous, has an 
on-demand network and enables sharing of computing resources in a  configurable  manner[2]. The 
computing resources that are most frequently utilised are servers, networks, services, and applications, 
which can be released and provisioned with minimal interaction from service providers. 
 
1.1. Cloud hallmarks 
  
The fundamental identifiab le features of c loud computing include rapid  elasticity, resource pooling, 
on-demand self-service, and b roadband network access[3]. At present, the categories of clouds include 
public, private, and community. Public c louds are available for public use, whereas private clouds are 
established in private organisations, where they are  used only by the employees and customers of those 
organisations. Commun ity clouds are used by groups of people who have the same objectives. Hybrid 
models that combine two or more of these categories also exist. 
Cloud services include platfo rm as a service  (PaaS), software as a service  (SaaS), and infrastructure 
as a service (IaaS) and are a ll delivered by the above models[4]. Providers allow c lients to offload 
costly applications such as Customer relationship management (CRM) and Enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) and run them at the cost of the provider[5]. The shared resources provided include 
network bandwidth, operating system, and database. 
 
1.2. Issue of security 
 
The key concern when considering a cloud server is its ability to remain trustworthy. Currently, 
most organisations are attempting to offload both sensitive and insensitive data as they try to obtain 
sufficient useful data for analysis. Pay as you use is the fundamental basis on which cloud servers are 
operated. When numerous requests are sent through to servers as a result of denia l o f service  (DoS) 
attacks, the recipient is forced to simultaneously process many more requests than they are able[6]. 
This leads to requests by legitimate users of the service being unfulfilled because the server is busy 
responding to the malic ious requests sent by the DoS. The situation is compounded when mu ltip le 
malicious requests are simultaneously coming from mult iple sources, leading to a situation referred as 
distributed DoS (DDoS).  
Attackers utilise various tools, such as Trinoo[7], Agobot , and Mstream [8], to carry out DDoS 
attacks. Most attackers tend to use less complicated attack tools based on the web, such as HTTP-based 
DoS (H-DoS) and XML-based DoS (X-DoS), wh ich are simple to imp lement but difficult to 
counter[6].  
The remainder o f this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews work related to cloud 
computing and DDoS. Section 3 presents our proposed approach. Section 4 discusses the results 
obtained. Finally, Section 5 concludes and outlines plans for future work.  
 
2. Literature review  
 
Prevention of legitimate access to specified data is achieved through introduction of DoS attackers. 
Through the Internet, attackers flood the connection of the vict im, making it  difficult for the user to 
access legitimate packets. In the recent past, DoS attacks have become increasingly  common. This can 
be attributed to their ease of execution and the challenge tracing the source poses. 
Tracing the source of a  DoS attack is cha llenging to  the users because the only method of detecting 
them is by identifying packets, and the packets are easily forged. A related study provided a solution 
comprising determination of the path fo llowed by the traversed packet over the Internet through a 
process known as problem trace back[9-13]. Th is traceback method is based on reconstruction of 
polynomial and algebra techniques based on coding and learning theory, which provide reliab le 
methods for reconstruction and transmission. 
Deterministic packet marking (DPM) is an IP traceback approach proposed by Belenky[14].  In the 
proposed method,  the packets are marked, with a one-bit reserved flag  (RF) and an 18-bit  ID field that 
are used together with an IP reader. The router interface c losest to the packet source performs the 
marking. On ly the information transferred with the DPM mark is then relied on for handling DDoS 
attacks. DPM marking thus aids the ingress of legit imate data  in  terms of continuous bit transfer. 
Additional information allows determination of segments of ingress address, which is important for 
understanding the specific destination. Users maintain a table that matches the ingress and source 
addresses that is maintained over time. A data structure referred to as a reconstruction table (rectbl) is 
utilised in the reconstruction procedure. On the a rrival of ingress segments at their destination, there  is 
a corresponding ingress address available to the identified user.  
Xiang [15] proposed a method called flexible  deterministic packet marking (FDPM), wh ich acts as a 
system of defence with the ability to identify the real sources of packets that carry out attacks through 
network transverse. The IP header provides the different bits that are used by the FDPM method. The 
marks a re flexible  and are  of varying lengths, according to the network p rotocols being used. They are 
typically referred to as length strategy flexible mark. FDPM flexib ility is based on two main folds. The 
first is based on network protocols used in different networks. FDPM adaptability in relation to 
networks that are heterogeneous is one of the main characteristics that distinguish it. Secondly, FDPM 
is able to adjust and adapt to marking rate through the process of continuous marking. This 
characteristic is important in that it prevents overload problems that would be caused by router 
traceback. The characteristics have been utilised to enhance attack filtering and increases traceability of 
DDoS.  
Hoi and Dai [16] presented a marking scheme wh ich consist of traceback algorithms and markings 
that enable the router to mark links associated with the path that the packets followed. Traffic 
distribution guides the distribution of the links, and presents them in the form of Huffman codes. The 
marking made by a certain router does not belong to that router but to another router that sent the data 
to the identified router. The  packet o f data is sent according to a link table  that allows identification of 
routers and their specific connectivity. Routers are guided by Huffman codewords, which present 
several links to other related routers at the router to which the packet has arrived.  
Information is stored in messages formed and related to the marking field through codewords that 
are lin ked to Huffman. The router stores the identified data in  the marked fie ld, which  are connected to 
the local memory of the user, which it clears on appending the codeword. The link of the stored 
message is later retrieved through the message digest that is directed to traceback the IP address. The 
traceback is accomp lished via probabilistic markings, which require relat ively less memory compared 
to different methods of logging, which are mainly associated with DDoS. 
An IP traceback scheme that uses intelligent decision prototype (IDP), a mach ine learning 
technique, was proposed by Chonka et al. [17]. The two schemes outlined above, DPM and 
probabilistic packet marketing (PPM), can use IDP to identify DDoS attacks. IDP is a supervised 
machine learn ing application that comprises two parts. The first part is pre-marked decision (PMD) 
which, like DPM, is found on the boundaries of routers. Packets are relayed to the router that follows 
or host in cases of legitimate traffic . However, the packet is sent for marking when PMD realizes that 
the signs shown by the packet are not legitimate. The second part of IDP comprises two sections: One 
section reconstructs the path going back to the attacker’s source, while the  other section deals with the 
concrete attack packet by employing a  machine  lea rning method known as reconstruct and drop 
(RAD). This helps to reduce the marked packets, thus enhancing the effic iency and effectiveness of the 
system in locating the source of the attack. 
An architectural standard and regulation called service oriented architecture (SOA) is used in the 
building of infrastructures; it eases the interaction between consumers and providers through services 
covering domains of ownership and technology. The service oriented traceback architecture (SOTA) is 
a new re lated approach proposed by Chonka [18] that provides a good framework for identifying the 
origin  of an attack. In  identifying the t rue source of DDoS, the SOA  approach is used by SOTA as the 
main t raceback methodology. The DPM packet-marking strategy is a lso utilised by SOTA. In this 
context, the DPM methodology is emp loyed to place a service oriented traceback mark (SOTM) in web 
service messages. SOTA  was further extended by Chonka et al. [19]to  enable it to prevent DDoS 
attacks on web services. SOTA  primarily identifies the true identity of fabricated messages, because 
attackers hide their identity in order that the defence system is barred from accessing the fabricated 
message. In order to function effectively the source of the attack should be close to SOTA. An inbound 
SOAP message is tagged with a SOAP header upon arrival at the router. The header is used to traverse 
the network back to the source of the attack. Chonka applied the framework to the open grid service 
architecture (OGSA) and provides a filter for defence known as XML Detector (XDetector), which 
defends it effectively by being evenly distributed in the grid. To enable detection and filtering of 
messages by XML-based DoS (X-DoS) attacks, a back propagation neural network is used to train the 
XML-based detector. For high e ffic iency and protection, the XDetector is placed in front of the web 
server.  
Chonka et al. [17] proposed a cloud-based traceback service architecture for the prevention of 
DDoS. In the proposed scheme, the origin of attacks is traced by cloud traceback (CTB). CTB also 
uses a cloud protector (XDetector), which filters attack traffic. In an  attack scenario, when  a web 
service is requested by an attack client from CTB, the request is passed to the web server, which 
formulates a SOAP message on the basis of the description of the service by the attack client. SOTA 
then places SOTM within the header of the SOAP message. The SOAP message is relayed to the web 
server on the placing of the CTBM. The v ictim o f an attack then asks for reconstruction to obtain the 
mark and transfer informat ion about the source of the message. Reconstruction filters the attack traffic 




3.1.  Proposed scheme 
 
In a typical DDoS attack, a mach ine is sent such a flood of messages that it can only manage to 
handle a few requests at a time , or the system ends up collapsing. Some types of DDoS attacks, such as 
XML and HTTP DoS attacks, can crash crowd web services. A combination of these two attacks is 
called  an HX-DoS attack. In a  DDoS attack scenario, the attacker may manage to comprise an 
individual who has access to an account on a server of the cloud service provider prior to the attack. 
This enables the attacker to connect directly through the system. The DoS attack program is installed 
by the attacker at  the user’s end and is init iated. One of the methods used to differentiate  attacks is the 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) where a decision tree classification system known as CLASSIE is 
used.  
CLASSIE is typically  located one hop away from the host. Its ru leset has over time been developed 
to recognize known DDoS messages. With known DDoS attacks such as XML payload overload and 
XML in jection, it  is  possible to tra in and test CLASSIE to recognize  the known  attributes. When 
CLASSIE detects a DDoS message, it drops the packet matching the ruleset. Following examination by 
CLASSIE, the packets are then subjected to marking. Figure 1 g ives a conceptual overview of our 
proposed approach. We propose a modulo packet-marking algorithm that marks packets with router 
informat ion as they move through the network. Following a traceback request, the path navigated by 
the packets is reconstructed using reverse modulo.  
The marking is carried out on both core and edge routers. When an incoming packet is to be marked 
by an edge router, the code to be marked is fetched if, it  matches the physical address of the host from 
the lookup table, and encoded into the packet. One bit is required by the edge router to indicate 
whether the packet has been marked and a few bits are used for marking code. A lookup table known 
as a MACtoID table is maintained. The table  contains the physical addresses of the hosts that are 
attached to the network along with their corresponding equivalent numeric code. The algorithm that 
performs the actual marking at the edge router uses the following steps: Step 1: For each packet, use 
the sender’s physical address to locate the code to be marked in the MACtoID table . Step 2: Set the 
marked field. Step 3: Stamp the code into the marked fie ld. Step 4: Forward the packet to the next 
router.  
A core router can only  mark after the edge router has marked the  packet; otherwise, the packets are  
simply forwarded. A table with the physical addresses of all the input addresses of the hardware and 
the lin k numbers that are  assigned to all the interfaces, known as a MAC to Interface table, is 
maintained by the core router. The algorithm used to conduct the marking at  the core  router comprises 
the following steps: Step 1: Fo r each packet, after the marked fie ld has been set, use the MAC to 
Interface table to locate the link number for the inbound interface on which the packet arrived. Step 2: 
Ca lculate the new marking informat ion. Step 3: Forward the packet to the next router. The table is 
consulted when the router decides to mark so as to locate the link number that has been assigned to the 
inbound interface. The modulo technique for marking is used by the core router and the Eq. 1 shows its 
calculation. RAD is constructed from IDP and is located one hop back from the victim. 
 
New marking information =  
 current marking information × number of interfaces on router + link number   (1).  
 
 In general, the same path (shortest path) is fo llowed by the host across the router to send packets to 
destinations. After the marking value and stored value matches, the packet is forwarded to the 
respective hosts. During an attack in which the IP address of a host is spoofed by another host, the 
marking value  of the packet d iffers from the va lue that is stored in the RAD. The reason is that when it 
comes to marking, CLASSIE utilises the MAC address and not the IP address. Therefore, the packets 
are left at the side of the victim and RAD asks for a traceback. When a victim is being attacked, a 
traceback request containing the marking information of the packet that needs to be traced is issued to 
the closest router responsible for delivering the packet. The reverse modulo is then used by the 
upstream router to locate the inbound interface of the offending packet with the use of marking 
informat ion located in the traceback request. The hardware  address table located at the inbound 


















Figure 1. Conceptual overview of our proposed approach 
        
Subsequently, the upstream router becomes the current router and the traceback procedure is 
performed repeatedly until the edge router of the sending host is reached. Consequently, the victim is 
able to find the routers that were  crossed by the attack packet and a request is sent to the edge router to 
locate the physical address of the node that the attack packet originated from. RAD functions by 
observing the incoming messages and decides if it  should allow the messages through or drop them. 
The spoofing attack is thus prevented after it finds the true origin of the packet.  
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
False alarm rate and detection rate (DR) are two of the most crucial parameters in detection and 
filtering during DDoS attacks. The DR of an attack traffic that has been trained and tested by 
CLASSIE equals true positive (TP). TP is defined as a system getting an alert when an attack occurs. 
False positive is defined as an a lert  being received by a  system even though an attack has not taken 
place. True negative is defined as no alert being issued when there is no attack. True negative is usually 
the default since there are no intruder attacks and therefore no alerts from the a larm are  being rece ived. 
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When the attacks from intruders occur without being noticed by the system, this is regarded as false 
negative (FP) is defined.   
A comparison of the mean length of the code required by our proposed scheme to the average length 
required by the Huffman code, indicate that the Huffman code requires mo re b its than our proposed 
modulo packet marking. Further, analysis of the performance of the proposed scheme to detect and 
trace different numbers of attack packets indicate that the module packet-marking perfo rmance is 
above that of the cloud protector. 
 
5. Conclusion and future work  
 
XML-based and HTTP DoS attacks are among some of the most serious threats affecting cloud 
computing. A packet-based marking approach can appropriately respond and detect such threats, filter 
them from the attacker side, and drop them. Th is action helps to reduce instances of DoS attacks, 
which fu rther reduces the rate of attacks. In this paper, we  proposed using RAD in place of cloud 
protector to enhance the ability to detect attacks and thus introduce modulo and CLASSIE marking on 
the source side. Our proposed scheme improves the rate of detection of DDoS attacks that are known to 
affect the reliability of transferred data. It  also helps to imp rove the FP rate through improved filtering 
and detection of DDoS attacks. In future work, we plan to extend our p roposed system by comb ining it 
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